Cornell Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 3 April 1935

Article 3

Extraterritorial Effect of the New York Mortgage
Moratorium
Parker Bailey
Charles Keating Rice

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Parker Bailey and Charles Keating Rice, Extraterritorial Effect of the New York Mortgage Moratorium , 20 Cornell L. Rev. 315 (1935)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol20/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE
NEW YORK MORTGAGE MORATORIUM
PARKER BAILEY
CHARLES KEATING RIcE

"The mortgage moratorium statutes do not apply where the
mortgaged realty is outside the state. They are based upon a
legislative finding that an emergency exists in New York. The
Legislature would not know and would not ordinarily inquire
whether a similar emergency exists in all the other states. Its
efforts to protect the mortgagors of New York realty cannot by
implication be extended to the owners of real property beyond
its limits. Consequently the restrictionsplaced on actions on bonds
secured by mortgages on real estate are applicable only where the
real estate is located in New York. .
In the foregoing succinct statement a New York Supreme Court
justice solves reasonably the problem presented by suit, in New York
upon an obligation secured by a mortgage upon foreign realty, to
which the New York moratorium was pleaded. It was held not to
bar the suit. It is the counter-problem with which the present discussion is concerned; namely, the possibility of suit in a foreign
jurisdiction upon an obligation secured by a mortgage on New York
realty, and in which the New York moratorium is relied upon as a
defense. The implications of the italicized portions of the sentences
above quoted are, it is believed, broader than would appear at first
glance. By what principles may the legislature's "efforts to protect
the mortgagors of New York realty" be exerted in foreign forums?
To what extent must other states find applicable "the restrictions
placed on actions on bonds secured by mortgages on real estate
[located in New York]"?
If one were to adopt the assumption that mortgage moratoria
relate merely to the remedy rather than to substance, it would normally result that the law of the forum would control. This would
mean that each state in which suit was brought o;1 an obligation
secured by a mortgage in another state would apply to such suit its
own moratory laws. Yet the court in Berkowitz v. Mengel Co., from
which the opening quotation is taken, arrives at a solution directly
contrary to this.
"Italics added.
2
Rosenman, J., in Berkowitz v. Mengel Co., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 30, 1934, page

(Supreme Court, New York County); see also Hackensack Trust Co. v.
Voight, C.C.A. (2d) 1935 N.Y.C.C.H. 66o.
2092
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Some months earlier a New York Municipal Court judge,' in
deciding a case with facts similar to those in the Berkowitz case,
dealt with the problem in this language:
"While the law unquestionably is that in so far as the remedy
is concerned, the law of the forum where the remedy is invoked
governs, yet for the reasons already stated, namely, that the
New York mortgage moratorium laws refer to the remedy only
in so far as it relates to real estate located in the state of New
York, the said moratorium laws do not control."
The New York law, of course, was not enacted for the benefit of
mortgage debtors who happened to be New Yorkers only by virtue
of domicile or residence, nor was it enacted in order to make New
York a haven in which mortgagor-defendants, domiciled elsewhere,
could set up a perfect defense because they happened to be sued in
New York during the moratory period. Coupling the statement

quoted above with the opinion of Justice Rosenman quoted at the
outset, we have one premise of first importance regarding the scope
of the remedy as affected by the moratorium. Because of the fact
that the moratorium is concerned only with local land and obligations
secured thereby, it is impossible to dispose of problems arising in
this connection, either in our own courts or elsewhere, simply by
resorting to the unmodified formula, "remedy, therefore lexfori."
Apparently no case has arisen in which an obligation secured by
a New York realty mortgage (within the protection of the moratorium) has been sued upon in a foreign forum. Moratory legislation
affecting matters other than mortgages has, however, been invoked
as a defense in many instances where suit has been brought outside
the immunized territory, and the decisions have been conflicting in
theory. Recent cases involving the effect of moratory laws as between
different states within the United States are few. One, involving an
emergency banking act in Maryland, 4 holds that the act cannot
apply in New York so as to suspend remedies of depositors, creditors,
3Sulzberger, J., in Porte v. Polachek, I5O Misc. 891, 27o N. Y. Supp. 807 (N. Y.
Mun. Ct., April i934). In this case the bond and mortgage were executed in Illinois, the mortgage being on Illinois realty. Illinois had passed no mortgage moratorium statutes. Suit was brought on the bond in New York, and the defendant
pleaded Section io83-b of the New York Civil Practice Act as a partial defense.
In addition to holding the New York moratorium a defense only when New York
realty was involved, the court held that the Illinois law controlled in any event,
since the contract was made there (citing Stumpf v. Hallahan, infra note 38).
4Doty v. Baltimore Trust Co., i47 Misc. 868, 265 N. Y. Supp. 66 (Supreme
Court, New York County, Special Term 1933). The case came up on a motion
by the defendant, appearing specially, to vacate a warrant of attachment issued
ex parte and served upon a bank depository of the defendant's funds. '

NEW YORK MORTGAGE MORATORIUM
and shareholders.' A creditor was therefore permitted to attach funds
of a Maryland bank on deposit in New York. It is submitted, however, that this decision was practically inevitable on the ground that
the provisional remedy of attachment is entirely procedural, and
therefore to be invoked pursuant to the law of the forum.
As between nations, the cases wherein the moratory laws of a
foreign country play a part 6 have usually turned in some measure
upon the law of the place of performance. In the case of Perry v.
Norddeutscher Lloyd7 a German corporation was sued on a bond in
New York, payable there. A German moratorium was pleaded as a
defense. It was not determined where the contract was made, and
the holding that the German moratorium was not operative by way
of defense may have been due to failure of proof of the German law,
or simply to an application of the well-known, though perhaps
obsolescent, principle that impossibility of performance by reason
of foreign law does not preclude recovery for failure to perform. In
discussing some years ago the effect of moratory legislation as between nations" Professor Lorenzen concluded that nations should give
effect to moratory statutes enacted at the place where the obligation
was performable, although indicating some doubt 9 as to whether a
similar rule should obtain as between states in our Union, in view of
certain constitutional objections to be considered later in this discussion.
6The Maryland Emergency Banking Act of 1933 purported to suspend temporarily all remedies of depositors, creditors, stockholders, and others.
6
Rouquette v. Overman, L. R. io Q. B. 525 (1875); Perry v. Norddeutscher
Lloyd, 15O Misc. 73, 268 N. Y. Supp. 525 (N. Y. Mun. Ct., 1934). Semble contra:
Taylor v. Kouchakji, reported only in 56 N. Y. L. J. 813 (Supreme Court, New
York County, Dec. 2, 1916), annotated in (1917) 3o HARV. L. REv. 39o, and in
(1917) 26 YALE L. J. 771. See Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 239
N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924) (restitution allowed in a New York suit in spite
of a Russian decree of confiscation; the language of Cardozo, J., at p. 170 indicates
that a decree of the place where the obligation was payable might have been a
defense to an action for damages); Goldmuntz v. Spitzel, 91 Misc. 148, 154 N. Y.
Supp. io25 (Supreme Court, New York County, I915), complaint dismissed 170
N. Y. Supp. 467 (Supreme Court, New York County, 1916) (stress laid upon
place of performance, although lex loci contractusand lex loci solutioniswere identical). See also Merchants Bank v. Eliot [1918] I West. Week. Rep. 698, 9 A. L. R.
58 (1920) (British Columbia War Relief Act suspending right to sue soldiers held
to relate only to procedure and not to bar suit in England on contract, it not
appearing where contract was performable). Cf. Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assurance Co., 266 N. Y. 71, 80, 193 N. E. 897 (1935).
7Supra note 6.
sSee Lorenzen, Moratory LegislationRelating to Bills and Notes and the Conflict
of Laws (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 324.
9
See Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 8, at 352.
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At least one other eminent writer in the field of Conflict of Laws10
is of the opinion that moratory legislation should receive extraterritorial recognition. He says:
"Suppose in a time of national emergency the lawmaking
power postpones the time for payment of obligations. Such moratory legislation is common in war time and was quite general
during the late World War. It would seem, following the discussion above, that the legislation should be held applicable to
all obligations performable in the state where the moratory
legislation was in force, and that the effect of such a moratorium
should be recognized wherever the question arises, as postponing the time for performance until the time set by the state
enacting the legislation... "11
It is clear that Professor Goodrich has in mind two criteria in
determining which law governs: first, the one relating to place of
performance regardless of where the obligation may have arisen;
second, the broader view that any obligation performable in a state
where moratory legislation is passed should carry with it the protection of the moratorium regardless of where suit happens to be brought.
He cites no supporting authority, however, other than the article by
Professor Lorenzen. 12.The argument of both writers seems to be that
moratory laws, like the laws respecting grace, medium of payment,
etc., relate to the time and manner of payment and therefore that
cases in which such moratory laws apply should be governed by the
law of the place of performance.13
By looking to the place of performance for the governing law,
perplexing questions of "substance" and "procedure" maybe avoided,
together with their usual irresolute analysis. It is obvious that neither
Professor Goodrich nor Professor Lorenzen conceives of moratory
legislation as relating to procedure. If they did, then by clear authority they would have to admit that such statutes could have no
extraterritorial effect, whereas in fact both argue that they should be
given such effect. Judicial authority, however, for the proposition
that the mortgage moratory laws under consideration do not relate
to the remedy is not so readily forthcoming. Indeed, in Klinke v.
10

GooDRICH ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 247.

"It is difficult to ascertain whether Professor Goodrich intends this solution to
apply as between states or merely as between nations.
12
Supra note 8.
13It is well established that matters relating to the time and manner of payment are governed by the law of the place of performance. Scudder v. Union
National Bank, 91 U. S.406 (1875); Union National Bank v. Chapman, 169
N. Y. 538, 62 N. E. 672 (19o2). "The law of place of performance governs the
postponement of performance by operation of law." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (934) §§ 358, 363.
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Samuels'4 the New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the constitutionality of one phase" of the New York mortgage moratoria,
declared:
"As to the constitutionality of these provisions we must
remember that the limitation upon the remedy16 in both or all
instances is until July i, I934." '
The court was not, however, passing upon the question of whether
the moratoria related to substance or to remedy, and if the full import
of the problem in the Conflict of Laws had been before it, it is doubtful whether the term, "remedy," would have been employed.' s It
seems far more satisfactory to treat the moratory statutes, or at
least those concerning merely the suspension of remedy, 19 as matters
relating to the time and manner of performance. In this way ques-,
tions, always difficult, of what is substance and what is procedure are
avoided. Furthermore, it was probably the intention of the parties
that if an emergency should suddenly arise, the law of the place of
performance should control. An argument of comity, strong as between nations, and persuasive even as between states, can be made
for this rule.20 It is submitted that if the New York mortgage moratorium is pleaded as a defense in a foreign forum, that forum should
not be constrained in passing upon the question by the dictum,
quoted above, in Klinke v. Samuels.
Assuming then that the moratory laws do not relate merely to the
remedy or procedure, there is still the constitutional objection, first
adverted to by Professor Lorenzen, 21 which remains to be considered.
If the moratoria affect substance rather than remedy or procedure,
do they impair the obligation of contract, so as to have no validity
1'264 N. Y. 144, igo N. E. 324 (I934).
5
1 NEw YORK CIV. PRAc. ACT (1920) § IO83-b, providing that in an action upon
an obligation secured by a mortgage the fair value of the premises must be deducted from the amount recovered.
"Italics added.

17The period of the emergency was thereafter extended successively by NEW
§ IO77-g, and by New York Laws 1935, c. I & 2
(approved January 18, 1935) until July 1,1936. For a general discussion of the
New York mortgage moratoria, see (1934) 19 CORNELL LAw QuARTERLY 316,324.
18It must be admitted, however, that the language of Judge Sulzberger in Porte
v. Polachek, supra note 3, seems to deal with the moratoria as matters of procedure.
"Such as NEw YORK CIv. PRAC. ACT (1920) § 107 7 -b.
YORK CIV. PRAc. AcT (1920)

2See LORENZEN,

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES

(1919) 161. It is not the purpose of this discussion to set out at length the argu-

ments in favor of the adoption of this rule. This has been ably done elsewhere.
See GOODRICH, loc. di. supra note IO; Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 8.

2"Supra note 9.
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either in the state of enactment or in a foreign forum? In New York
the most dubious phase of the moratorium, Section io83-b of the Civil
Practice Act, has already been held constitutional. 22 Unless the holding in the Klinke case should be reversed upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States,n it is probable that it would be taken as
strongly persuasive authority by any other state court, if the constitutional question of impairment were raised in a suit outside of
New York upon an obligation secured by a New York real estate
mortgage. Furthermore, although two or three decades ago decisions
very probably would have been rendered upon the premise that
any law affecting the substantive contractual obligation must be
within the prohibition of Article'I, Section io of the Federal Constitution, the recent trends in the field of state legislation give freer and
freer rein to the police, power of the state.24 In the Blaisdell casess
Chief Justice Hughes gives unequivocal expression to present judicial
thought when he says: 26

"The economic interests of the state may justify the exercise
of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts."
And in the recent case of Matter of People (Title and Mortgage Guaranty Company)2 7 Judge Lehman, after quoting with approval the
above language of Chief Justice Hughes, goes on to say:
" . ..At times postponement of the enforcement of contractual obligations or their temporary impairment may be'2the
means
8
reasonably adopted to meet a temporary condition.
22

Klinke v. Samuels, supra note 14.
The moratory statute of Minnesota which was held constitutional in Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934),
did not contain provisions such as those found in Sections 1083-a and IO83-b of
the New York Civil Practice Act, relating to the deduction of the fair value of the
premises from any deficiency judgment recovered. Certain language of Chief
Justice Hughes at page 425 in the Blaisdell case casts some doubt upon the validity of this phase of the New York moratoria. It is believed, however, that the
Supreme Court might consistently hold that there is no fundamental difference
between the sections above referred to and Section 1077-b of the Act (providing
that no foreclosure be instituted for default in principal), since Sections 1083-a
and Io83-b might be construed as suspensive statutes, full recovery being permitted if the mortgagee is willing to wait until the moratory period elapses.
2
1See The Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution (1932) 32 COL. L. Rr.v.
476, 479, where it is argued that the issue of the contract clause (of the Federal
Constitution) in a private contract presents no problem supplemental to that of
23

due2 process; (1933) 32 MicH. L. Rav. 71, 73.
5Supra note 23.
25At page 437.
27264 N. Y. 69, 96, 19o N. E. 153, 162 (1934).
28

1talics added.
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At the time when Professor Lorenzen wrote, one analyzing the
problem of the extraterritorial effect of mortgage moratoria was faced
with a- dilemma. If he treated them as affecting the remedy, they
could obviously have no extraterritorial effect. If he treated them as
affecting the substance of the obligation, they would be held to
inpair the obligation of contract and therefore have no effect in any
state. Today, when it is recognized that laws may alter the substance
as well as the remedy of contracts if otherwise consistent with due
process, it is believed that it can be argued successfully that moratory
laws may affect substance rather than procedure and still be constitutional, fully entitled to recognition elsewhere as the law of the
place of performance. 29 In several well considered cases New York
courts have already held the moratoria constitutional, and even
though the use of the term, "remedy," by the Court of Appeals,
be deemed not to restrict the interpretation of the laws in question
to procedure alone, it is submitted that the constitutional objection
hinted at by Professor Lorenzen should not be upheld today by a
foreign forum. 30
All of the discussion thus far is applicable particularly to Section
I077-b of the New York Civil Practice Act, which suspends the right
to sue on an obligation secured by a mortgage where no foreclosure
could have been had. Sections 1o83-a and Io83-b present a more
special problem, though in a sense they too might be deemed suspensive statutes.3' Section io83-a provides that in the type of action
in which foreclosure is possible, a motion must be made within
ninety days after the consummation of the sale for a deficiency
judgment, 2 and that from the judgment for the amount due must be
29Cf. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1236, 1241, where it is said: "Any relief measure
which does not substantially modify the debtor's obligation fails of its purpose.
Chief Justice Marshall's distinction [between substance and remedy] is therefore wholly inadequate as a test of constitutionality."
3In the Blaisdell case, supra note 23, the majority opinion cites numerous instances wherein laws have been upheld which impaired rights undir contracts
and states that it is irrelevant whether this results directly or indirectly from the
legislation.
"1See the discussion of this point supra note 23.
"The section further provides that if no motion for a deficiency judgment is
made within the ninety-day period, the proceeds of the sale will be deemed to be
in full satisfaction of the debt. If no motion were made within the required period
and subsequently suit were brought in a foreign forum, the question whether it
would allow the suit or recognize the New York law would be raised. It is believed that a foreign forum would not allow the suit. Several New York cases
dealing with a similar provision in a New Jersey statute have denied the right
after the statutory period has elapsed to move for a deficiency judgment in New
York. See Apfelberg v. Lax, 255 N. Y. 377, 174 N. E. 759 (1931); Hutchinson v.

Ward,

192

N. Y. 375, 85 N. E. 390 (19o8).

322
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subtracted the fair value of the premises if it is greater than the
sale value. Section xo83-b provides that in an action on an obligation secured by a mortgage the fair value of the premises must be
deducted from the amount recovered. Whether a foreign forum
would enforce the New York law by requiring the deduction of the
fair value of the premises from a recovery in that forum on the bond
or other evidence of indebtedness is a close question of law.
It is strongly arguable that these sections affect the manner of
discharge of the obligation, and that therefore the law of the place of
performance should control.33 If the sections be regarded only as a
limitation upon the right to sue for the indebtedness, authority is
available to support the theory that a transitory cause of action such
as this may be sued upon in any state where jurisdiction of the defendant is obtained, and that the statutory limitation upon the right
to sue is confined to the state of its enactment." Yet there is also
authority to the effect that such restrictions concern themselves with
the substantive right of action.3 In the case of Maxwell v. Ricks 5
action was brought in Washington on a note secured by a mortgage
on realty in California. The defendant pleaded a California statute
providing that a foreclosure must precede any suit on a debt secured
by a mortgage. The court held that the note represented a transitory
cause of action suable wherever jurisdiction of the defendant could
be obtained; that the California statute merely limited the remedy
without affecting the right, and was therefore no defense. A contrary
decision was rendered in New York on facts substantially similar.3 7
In Stumpf v. Hallahani the mortgagee was a resident of New
Jersey. The mortgagors were residents of New York. A bond and
mortgage were executed in New York. The mortgage was on New
nIt is generally held that matters relating to the discharge of a contract are
governed by the law of the place of performance. See Thompson-Houston Electric
Co. v. Palmer, 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. 1137 (1893); Mountain Lumber Co. v.
Davis, 9 F. (2d) 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), afd, iI F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926);
Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. R. 648 (1931).
uMaxwell v. Ricks, 294 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Commercial National
Bank of Los Angeles v. Catron, 50 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. ioth, 193I).
"Robinson v. Stratman, 141 Misc. 393, 252 N. Y. Supp. 557 (Supreme Court,
Erie County, 1931).

a"Supranote 34.
3rRobinson v. Stratman, Supqra note 35.
8

3 iox App. Div. 383, 91 N. Y. Supp. IO62 (Ist Dept. 1905), affid, without opinion 185 N. Y. 550, 77 N. E. 1196 (I9o6). It would seem, however, that this case
could have been decided on the ground that the limitation was not a general, but
a special, one. Such limitations, unlike a general statute of limitations, are generally governed by lex loci contractus. See GOODRICH, Op. cit. supra note IO, at
page 170.
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Jersey land. The court held the bond payable in New Jersey on the
ground that the mortgagee lived there and that a debtor must seek
out his creditor to make a payment. The New Jersey law required
that suit for a deficiency judgment be brought not later than six
months after the sale. The New York court held that the New Jersey
law governed, since the land was in New Jersey and the bond was
payable there. The case indicates that such limitations on the right
to sue are governed by the law of the place of performance, although
the court seemed to have the "essential validity" of the obligation in
mind rather than the manner of its performance.' 9
The decisions bring forth no clear-cut rule, but it appears that
there is authority for the proposition that statutes restricting in some
manner the complete freedom to sue on a bond secured by a mortgage
affect the substance rather than procedure. By analogy it might be
successfully argued that Sections 1o83-a and io8 3 -b of the New York
Civil Practice Act should be given effect in a foreign forum.
Underlying all of the previous discussion is the possibility, adumbrated by the comparatively recent case of Bradford Electric Light
Company v. Clapper,40 that recognition of the New York moratoria
would be granted in a foreign forum, not by virtue of comity or the
39
In Thompson v. Lakewood City Development Co., IO5 Misc. 68o, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 825 (I919), affd, 188 App. Div. 996, 177 N. Y. Supp. 926 (2nd Dept., I919),
a corporate mortgage was given on property in New Jersey. The bonds were executed in New York and payable there. New Jersey law required foreclosure before
suit could be brought on the bond. Suit was brought in New York on the bond
prior to foreclosure. The New York law was held to control since it was both let
loci contractus and lex loci solutionis. The Slumpf case is distinguishable because
of the difference in the place of performance. But see Robinson v. Stratman,
supranote 35. Cf. Hall v. Hoff, 295 Pa. 276, 145 Atl. 301 (1929).
Statutes in several states require foreclosure before suit may be brought on the
bond. It is generally held that such statutes do not bar suit prior to foreclosure
where the mortgaged property is in another state. Mantle v. Dabney, 47 Wash.
394, 92 Pac. 134 (1907); Denver Stockyards Bank v. Martin, 177 Cal. 223, 170

Pac. 428 (1918); Colton v. Salomon, 67 N. J. L. 73, 5o Atl. 588 (I9oi). See also
Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 36 Pac. 676 (1894). If such a statute is in force in
the state where the mortgaged property lies, some courts have held it a defense
to a suit brought elsewhere on the bond. Robinson v. Stratman, supra note 35;
cf. Stumpf v. Hallahan, supra note 38; McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 285 Pac.
208 (1930); Newman v. Brigantine Beach R. Co., 15 Pa. Co. 625 (1874). There is
authority to the contrary in what may be called the federal rule. Maxwell v.
Ricks, supra note 34; Commercial National Bank of Los Angeles v. Catron, supra
note 34. Cf. Thompson v. Lakewood City Development Co., supra.
40286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571 (1932), annotated in (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rnv.
291; (1933) 27 ILL. L. REV. 573; (1932) iI N. C. L. REv. I6; (1932) 19 VA. L.
Rxv. 64; (1932) 42 YALE L. J. II 5 . See also Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Ref. Co.,
47 F. (2d) 615 (D. Kan. 193O).
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"better view" in the Conflict of Laws, but as a matter of constitutional right under the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal
Constitution, which embraces not only judgments but "public acts"
of sister states.4' In the Clapper case the decedent was killed while in
in the employ of a Vermont corporation as he was making emergency
repairs in New Hampshire. His administratrix brought an action
under the New Hampshire death act pursuant to a provision thereof
permitting an election of the common-law recovery after injury.
The defendant pleaded a Vermont statute to the effect that compensation thereunder should be the sole remedy of an employee whether
the injury occurred in Vermont or elsewhere. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the Vermont statute must be given
full faith and credit by New Hampshire.
In connection with the Clappercase, the case of Ohio v. Chattanooga
Boiler & Tank Company must be considered. At first glance it might
appear that much of the force of the "Clapper doctrine" is lost in the
subsequent decision. In-the Chattanoogacase the facts and the workmen's compensation statute involved were almost identical with
those in the Clapper case.43 The court, however, chose to distinguish
the Clapper case on the ground that the Vermont statute did not
permit suit elsewhere, while in the Chattanoogacase the Tennessee
statute, although similarly phrased, had been held by the court of
last resort in Tennessee not to exclude suit elsewhere.
A strict interpretation of the Chattanoogadecision would seem to
point to the conclusion that the Clapper doctrine will be restricted
41

See Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24
ILL. L. R-v. 383.
4 2 89 U. S. 439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663 (1933).
43
0ne Tidwell, an employee of Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Company (a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of business in that state) was killed
in Ohio while erecting a tank for the company. His contract of employment, entered into in Tennessee, provided that he serve also in other states. The corporation had no regular place of business in Ohio and had not qualified to do
business there. Both Tidwell and the corporation were residents of Tennessee
and had accepted the provisions of the Tennessee workmen's compensation act.
After Tidwell's death his widow filed her claim, however, under the Ohio workmen's compensation act. The Ohio Commission made an award, and upon failure
of the Chattanooga company to pay it, it was paid from the Ohio insurance fund.
Ohio then invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States in an action against the company for reimbursement. The company, relying upon the rule of Bradford Electric Light Company v. Clapper, set up the defense that Ohio should have given full faith and credit to the Tennessee workmen's compensation act in making the original award. The court, in refusing to
accept this defense as valid, said that the "full faith and credit" clause did not
require that greater effect be given the Tennessee statute elsewhere than is given
in the courts of that state.
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to the recognition of statutes which contain a clause precluding suit
elsewhere. 4 But the opinion in the Clapper case hardly seems to
contemplate such drastic restriction, and the Chattanooga decision
does not compel it. The Clapperdoctrine, as originally stated, seemed
to be substantially this: that where parties have by their conduct
subjected themselves to certain obligations under the law of a given
state, choosing thereafter to litigate their rights in a forum which has
only a casual interest in the suit, the forum will be compelled to
45
recognize the obligation as created under the law of the sister state.
The points stressed in the case were the casual nature of the interest
of the forum in the suit, and the irremediable liability consequent
upon a refusal "to give effect to a substantive defense under the
applicable law of another state." 41 In the Chattanoogacase, while it is
true that Ohio had the same sort of "casual interest" in the suit that
New Hampshire had in the Clapper case, the Tennessee statute,
as interpreted by its own court, did not present a substantive defense
"under the applicable law of another state," for the reason that it
did not exclude suit elsewhere. The New York mortgage moratoria,
on the other hand, clearly constitute such "substantive defenses." 47
"Beale, Two Cases on Jurisdiction(1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 620, seems to take
this view.
45
Even before the Chattanoogadecision it had been suggested that the doctrine
of the Clapper case would be confined to decisions in the fields of insurance and
workmen's compensation. See (1932) 46 HARV. L. REV. 291, 295. In this connection see Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35
Sup. Ct. 724 (1915); Modem Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544,
45 Sup. Ct. 389 (1925); Horovitz, How Far Workmen's Compensation Acts Can
Apply to Maritime Law, InterstateCommerce, and the Doctrine of Extraterritoriality
(1932) U. S. DEPT. OF LAB.: BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 15. On the other hand it had
also been argued that the Clapper doctrine might ultimately be held to cover any
case wherein the foreign forum had only a "casual interest" in the obligations
created by or under the law of the sister state. See (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 115.
The Clapper doctrine does not amount to giving state legislation extraterritorial effect, Mr. Justice Brandeis points out, since recognition under the full
faith and credit clause does not embody the concept of local law controlling courts
beyond state lines. The word, "extraterritorial," in the title to this discussion is
used in a loose and non-technical sense, solely for the purpose of conveying immediately to the reader the scope and contentof the discussion.
46Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 16o, 52 Sup. Ct. 571,
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To restate the distinction briefly: it is possible that the presence of a clause
precluding suit elsewhere may be held a factor of importance only in determining whether the statute of the sister state presents a substantive defense. If the
statute contains a substantive defense irrespective of such a clause, and the other
requirements of the Clapper doctrine are satisfied, the statute may be given
recognition elsewhere regardless of such a clause.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
It is believed by at least one writer48 that the Clapper doctrine,
even though interpreted in the narrow sense previously suggested,
is a pernicious one, tending to throw into confusion many of the
established doctrines in Conflict of Laws, and likely to bring about a
"race of diligence between states to get in the first statute' '49 containing a clause to preclude suit elsewhere. In spite of this, the
possibility that recognition of the New York mortgage moratoria
would be compelled under the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Federal Constitution should not be overlooked, particularly where
,the mortgaged land is in New York, the parties are New York
residents, and the bond and mortgage were executed and payable
in New York."
CONCLUSIONS

i. A foreign forum probably would not apply its own moratory
laws to a suit there on an indebtedness secured by a mortgage on
New York land; in other words, as to such suits the law of the forum
would not control.
2. If suit were brought in a foreign forum on an obligation performable in New York and secured by a mortgage on New York
land, and under Section io77-a of the New York Civil Practice Act
the mortgage itself could not be foreclosed, the foreign forum probably would give effect to Section 1077-b of the Act, suspending the

right of action on the obligation.
3. If suit were brought in a foreign forum on this sort of obligation,
and under circumstances whereby Section 1083-a or Section xo83-b
of the Act would apply if suit had been brought in New York, the
foreign forum would probably give effect to these sections by requiring the deduction of the fair value of the premises from any
judgment recovered. It is possible that a different result might be
reached in the federal courts, which have shown a tendency to disregard the restrictions imposed by a foreign state upon the right to
sue.
4. Under circumstances such that the foreign forum has only a
"casual interest" in the suit, it might be required by the Federal Constitution to give full faith and credit to the New York moratorium, provided that the land were situate in New York, and the obligation
sued upon were performable there.
48

See Beale, op. cit. supra note 44.

49
Beale, op. cit. supra note 44, at page 625.
50

The court commented in the Clapper case upon the fact that Clapper was
not a resident of New Hampshire. Whether the decision would have gone the
other way if he had been a resident of New Hampshire is not clear, though it may
be doubted. Compare the language of Sulzberger, J., in Porte v. Polachek, supra
note 3 where it is said that the benefits of the New York moratoria were intended
for citizens of New York state.

